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## *Integrating Wireless Sensor Networks into Internet of things for Security*

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**Abstract:** A secure channel between a sensor node and internet host is created, hence new security challenges arises and wireless sensor networks is integrated into internet of things. We use heterogeneous online/offline signcryption scheme so that secure communication is provided. We use bilinear diffie-hellman inversion problem in random oracle model, it provides indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen messages attacks. This scheme has the following advantages: First, it achieves confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation in a logical single step. Second, it allows a sensor node in an identity-based cryptography to send a message to an Internet host in a public key infrastructure. Third, it splits the signcryption into two phases: i) offline phase; and ii) online phase. In offline phase heavy computations are carried out and in online phase light computations are done. This scheme is suitable to provide security solution for integrating WSN into the IoT. We use the concept of cellular communication and use implement for an industrial application.

**Keywords:** Wireless sensor network, Internet of Things, heterogeneous online/offline scheme, cryptography, signcryption.

### I. INTRODUCTION

The Internet of Things (IoT) is a booming field that has received considerable attention from both academy and industry. The primary idea of IoT is permanent presence for variety of objects such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags, sensors, actuators, mobile phones, etc.-which, through unique addressing schemes, are able to view each other and collaborate with their neighbors to reach common goals[2]. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are ad hoc networks which consist of a large number of small sensor nodes with restricted resources and one or more base stations. Usually, sensor nodes consist of a processing unit with constrained computational power and limited capacity. [6]To guarantee unforgeability, integrity and confidentiality of communications, the traditional method is to digitally sign a message then followed by public key encryption. [1] On the other hand, the base station is a powerful trusted device that acts as an medium between the network user and the nodes.[1] WSNs have many applications, that includes military sensing and tracking, environment monitoring, target tracking, healthcare monitoring, and so on. The data received from the sensors through the base station can be read by users of WSN. If we wish to read the data from anywhere in the world, we need to integrate the WSNs into the Internet as part of the IoT. [6]A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a wireless network consisting of spatially distributed autonomous devices using sensors to cooperatively monitor physical or environmental conditions, such as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure, motion or pollutants, at different locations. [3]There are three methods to achieve this integration, front-end proxy solution, gateway solution and TCP/IP overlay solution. In the front-end proxy solution, the base station acts as an interface between the WSNs and the Internet. There is no direct connection between the Internet and a sensor node. The base station allows all incoming and outgoing information. In the gateway solution, the base station acts as an application layer gateway that translates the lower layer protocols from both networks. In the TCP/IP overlay solution, sensor nodes communicate with each nodes using TCP/IP.

The base station acts as a router that forwards the packets from and to the sensor nodes. In both gateway solution and TCP/IP overlay solution, the sensor nodes can communicate with the Internet hosts directly. However, new security challenges will appear, such as setup of a secure channel between a sensor node and an Internet host that supports end-to-end authentication and confidentiality services. The computational power and storage of a sensor node are always limited. [5] A new identity based signature (IBS) scheme without MapToPoint function in the random oracle model, which offers better performance than Other IBS schemes from pairings. This ensures a better security aid for communication. The internet of things is nothing but combination of sensors and connectivity.

[4]To support the authenticity of public keys in the public key cryptography, there are two main infrastructures called public key infrastructure (PKI) and identity-based cryptography (IBC) . In the PKI, a certificate authority (CA) issues a certificate which provides an unforgeable and trusted link between the public key and the identity of a user by the signature. The drawback of the PKI is that we need to manage certificates, including revocation, storage and distribution. In addition, we need to verify the validity of certificates before using them. On the other hand, the dependence on the PKG who can generate all users' secret keys inevitably causes the key escrow problem in the IBC. For the WSNs, IBC is the best choice because there is no certificates problem. However, Identity Based Cryptography is only suitable for small networks. For the Internet security, we need PKI technique.

### A. Contribution

The motivation of this paper is to setup a secure channel between a sensor node and an Internet host that supports end-to-end confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-refusal services. In addition, we require that the IBC is used in the sensor node and that the PKI is used in the Internet host. We also require that the computational cost of sensor nodes is low. Our solution is heterogeneous online/offline signcryption (HOOSC). Concretely, we propose an efficient HOOSC scheme. We prove that the proposed scheme has the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) under the bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion problem (BDHIP) and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen messages attacks (EUF-CMA) under the  $q$ -strong Diffie-Hellman problem ( $q$ -SDHP) in the random oracle model. We have a computational problem called twin bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion (BDHI) problem. But for our work bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion is more suitable. Our scheme has the following characteristics: (i) It achieves confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-refusal in a logical single step. (ii) It allows a sensor node in the IBC to send a message to an Internet host in the PKI. (iii) It splits the signcryption into two phases: offline phase and online phase. In the offline part, most heavy computations are done without the knowledge of a message. In the online stage, only light computations are done when a message is known.

### B. Related Work

Signcryption [5] is a new cryptographic primitive that fulfills both the functions of digital signature and public key encryption in a logical single step, at a cost significantly lower than that required by the traditional signature-then-encryption approach. That is, signcryption can simultaneously achieve confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-refusal at a lower cost. The performance advantage of signcryption over the signature-then-encryption method makes signcryption useful in many applications, such as electronic commerce, mobile communications and smart cards.

In 2010, Sun and Li [7] proposed two heterogeneous signcryption schemes. The first scheme allows a sender in the PKI to send a message to a receiver in the IBC. The second scheme allows a sender in the IBC to send a message to a receiver in the PKI. But their schemes are only secure against outsider attacks (i.e. attacks made by an attacker who is neither the sender nor the receiver). Such signcryption schemes do not provide any kind of non-refusal function. The insider security means that (i) if a sender's secret key is exposed, an attacker is still not able to recover the message from the ciphertext and (ii) if a receiver's secret key is exposed, an attacker is still not able to forge a ciphertext. [6]Our new technique allows the offline information to be re-usable. It performs the signature generation procedure in two phases. [6]The first phase is performed offline (prior to the

knowledge of the message to be signed) and the second phase is performed online (after knowing the message to be signed). In WSN, the offline phase can be executed at the base station, while the online phase is to be executed in the WSN node. The online phase is typically very fast, and hence can be executed efficiently even on a weak processor, such as a node in WSN.

In cellular communication concept, in allocated area only main cells can be accessed, for more detailed and large information to be accessed, the main cell is further subdivided into many micro cells and the information is accessed.

### C. Organization

We use heterogeneous offline/online scheme in our paper. We show the working of HOOSC scheme in exploratory section II. The formal model of HOOSC in section III. An efficient HOOSC scheme is proposed in section IV. We analyze the proposed scheme in section V. finally; the conclusion is given in section VI.

## II. EXPLORATORY

Given two groups  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  of the same prime order  $p$ , a bilinear map  $e : C_1 \times C_1 \rightarrow C_2$  and a generator  $P$  of  $C_1$ , the  $q$ -bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion problems ( $q$ -BDHIP) in  $(C_1, C_2, e)$  is to compute  $e(P, P)^{1/\alpha}$  given  $(P, \alpha P, \alpha^2 P, \dots, \alpha^q P)$ . We call bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion problem (BDHIP) when  $q = 1$ .

**Definition 1:** The  $(e, t)$ -BDHIP assumption holds if no  $t$ -polynomial time adversary  $S$  has advantage  $\epsilon$ . Given two groups  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  of the same prime order  $p$ , a bilinear map  $e : C_1 \times C_1 \rightarrow C_2$  and a generator  $P$  of  $G_1$ , the  $q$ -strong Diffie-Hellman problem ( $q$ -SDHP) in  $(C_1, C_2, e)$  is to find a pair  $(w, (1/\alpha + w)(P)) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \times C_1$  given  $(P, \alpha P, \alpha^2 P, \dots, \alpha^q P)$ .

**Definition 2:** The  $(e, t)$ - $q$ -SDHP assumption holds if no  $t$ -polynomial time adversary  $C$  has advantage at least  $\epsilon$  in solving the  $q$ -SDHP problem.

## III. MODEL OF HOOSC




Fig. 1. Communication model for integrating WSNs into the Internet

In this area, we give the definition and security notions of HOOSC. The paper is based on the concept that sender belongs to the IBC and receivers belong to the PKI.

### A. SYNTAX

A general HOOSC scheme consists of the following five algorithms.

**Setup:** This is a probabilistic algorithm that runs by PKG that takes as input a security parameter  $k$ , and outputs a master secret key  $msk$  and the system parameters  $params$  that includes a master public key  $mpk$ .

**IBC-Kg:** This is used as a key generation algorithm for IBC users. The user submits an identity  $ID$  to the respective PKG. The PKG computes the corresponding secret key  $sk$  and transmits it to the user in a secure way.

**PKI-Kg:** This is used as a key generation algorithm for PKI users. The user can choose its secret key  $sk$  and publishes the corresponding public key  $pk$ . This public key needs a digital certificate that is sign by its CA.

**off-signcrypt:** This is a commonly used probabilistic offline signcryption algorithm run by a sender that takes input as the

system parameters  $\text{param}$ , a sender's private key  $sk_s$  and a receiver's public key  $pk_r$ , and outputs an offline signcryption  $\delta$ .

**On-Signcrypt:** This is a probabilistic online signcryption algorithm run by the sender that takes as an input the system parameters  $\text{param}$ , a message  $m$  and an offline signcryption  $\delta$ , and outputs a full signcryption ciphertext  $\sigma$ .

**Unsigncrypt:** This is a deterministic unsigncryption algorithm that is run by a receiver that takes input as a ciphertext  $\sigma$ , a sender's public key  $pk_s$  and the receiver's secret key  $sk_r$ , and outputs the plaintext  $m$  or the symbol  $\perp$  if  $\sigma$  is an invalid ciphertext between the sender and the receiver.

These algorithms will satisfy standard HOOSC scheme.

For secure communication for integrating WSNs into the Internet, a sensor node is considered as a sender and an Internet host is considered as a receiver. HOOSC provides a secure channel between the sensor node and the Internet host that timbers end-to-end confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation services.

In Fig.1 there is a connection from nodes to host in internet through IBC and PKI.

## B. SECURITY NOTATIONS

The standard security notations for signcryption are indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen messages attacks (EUF-CMA). We can modify the notations slightly based on [6],[8] to adapt for HOOSC.

**Phase 1:** A performs a polynomially bounded number of unsigncryption queries in an adaptive manner. In an unsigncryption query, A submits a sender's identity  $ID_s$  and a ciphertext  $\sigma$ . C runs  $\text{Unsigncrypt}(\sigma, ID_s, sk_r^*)$  algorithm and sends the result to A.

**Phase 2:** A can ask a polynomially bounded number of queries adaptively again as in the Phase 1. This time it cannot make an unsigncryption query on  $(\sigma^*, ID_s^*)$  to obtain the respective plaintext.

**Definition 3:** A HOOSC scheme is  $(e, t, q_u)$ -IND-CCA2 secure if no probabilistic  $t$ -polynomial time adversary A has advantage at least  $e$  after at most  $q_u$  unsigncryption queries in the IND-CCA2 game.

**Definition 4:** A HOOSC scheme is  $(e, t, q_k, q_s)$ -EUF-CMA secure if no probabilistic  $t$ -polynomial time adversary F has advantage at least  $e$  after at most  $q_k$  key generation queries and  $q_s$  signcryption queries in the EUF-CMA game.

Fig.2 explains the steps for secure communication using heterogeneous online/offline scheme




Fig.2. Steps for secure communication

## IV. A HOOSE SCHEME

In this area, we propose an efficient HOOSC scheme which is based on Barreto et al.'s signcryption scheme [9].

**Setup:** Given a security parameter  $k$ , the PKG chooses groups  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  of prime order  $p$  (with  $C_1$  additive and  $C_2$  multiplicative), a generator  $P$  of  $C_1$ , a bilinear map  $\hat{e} : C_1 \times C_1 \rightarrow C_2$ , and hash functions  $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow Z_p^*$ ,  $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^n \times C_1 \times C_2 \rightarrow Z_p^*$ , and  $H_3 : G_2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ . Here  $n$  is the number of bits of a message to be signcrypted.

For secure communication integrating WSNs into the Internet, a sensor node is considered as a sender and an Internet host is regarded as a receiver. First, the sensor node is loaded with pre-computed results  $\delta = (x, r, \beta, S, T)$  of the offline phase from a more efficient device. When the sensor node wants to send a message  $m$  to the Internet host, the sensor node runs  $\sigma = \text{On-Signcrypt}(m, \delta)$  algorithm and sends the ciphertext  $\sigma$  to the Internet host. In this process, the sensor node only does light computations, such as exclusive OR, hash function, modular multiplication and modular inverse. When receiving the ciphertext  $\sigma$ , the Internet host runs  $m = \text{Unsigncrypt}(\sigma, I D_s, s k_r)$  algorithm to obtain the message  $m$ . Our scheme simultaneously achieves confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation.

Fig.2 explains the steps for secure communication using heterogeneous online/offline scheme




Fig 3. Indication of disconnection in transmission

## V. CONCLUSION

In this paper I have used heterogeneous online/offline signcryption scheme. It permits a sensor node in IBC to send a message to an internet host in the PKI. Our scheme has chosen both online/offline technique and IBC technique to reduce computational cost of sensor nodes to a greater extent. Internet hosts allow supporting many terms such as end-to-end confidentiality, authentication and non-repudiation services. We will use this scheme and work out for an industrial application. It uses cellular communication concept of main cell and dividing it into microcell. Thus using the HOOSC scheme we make WSN information more secure and implementing it in industry application.

## VI. RESULTS

There are 10 nodes. UDP and TCP traffics are generated within the nodes. If there is congestion or traffic problems within particular nodes, then there is a disconnection in the path, hence indicated by red color, hence the transmission takes a different path for the information to be transmitted. It is indicated by the simulation result. Fig 3 explains the transmission of information via nodes.

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